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Pacourek v. Inland Steel Company: Enforcing Equal 
Protection Rights by Designating 
Infertility as a Disability Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co, Inc., 1 the Federal District Court of the 
Northern District of Illinois articulated a three-prong test as a means of 
determining whether the condition of infertility falls under the protection 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 2 The decision in Pacourek, how-
ever, does not by any means answer the question; there is a definite split 
in the courts regarding infertility's qualifications as a basic disability. 
This issue has become increasingly important to employers and insurance 
companies alike, but those principally affected are, of course, the individ-
uals who must cope with the physical and psychological effects of their 
own infertility. 3 
While the main issue in Pacourek was over the dismissal of the suit 
itself, other similar cases have arisen over insurance coverage. 4 The issue 
is being watched carefully by the management side of the equation (i.e., 
employers and insurers) due to the potential for fertility treatments requir-
ing coverage by law under the Act. The central concern for both of the 
* Copyright © 1997 by Kristina M. Hall. 
!. 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)[hereinafter "Act" or "ADA"). 
3. See Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility: Fertile Grounds for 
Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1051, 1085-88 (1996); Rhonda S. Tischler, Infertility: A Forgotten Disability, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 
249, 251 (1994). 
4. This note examines construction of the ADA and the extension of equal protection to 
those suffering from infertility. The implications of ADA coverage in regard to insurance. benefits 
necessarily require consideration of factors related to business, insurance, and employment law, 
rather than disability and equal ptotection. For information pertaining to the impact in fixmer area~. 
see, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995), aff'd., 
95 F.3d 674(8th Cir. 1996); Maciosek v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 930 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 
1991); Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988); Kinzie v. Physicians 
Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (all holding that insurance coverage wa< 
properly denied on basis that infertility treatments are not "medically necessary" to the physical 
health of the insured). Cf, e.g., Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities 
for Northeastern Illinois University (N.D. Ill. 1995); Ralston v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 617 
So.2d 1379 (3d Cir. 1993); Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Witcraft v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group, 420 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1988)(all allowing 
insurance coverage for infertility treatments). 
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aforementioned parties lies in the costs associated with infertility treat-
ments, as well as employee absenteeism in the case of the employers. 
As there is no overriding precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court, the courts have been left to their own devices to come up with so-
lutions to the controversy. As is common with new laws, the eye of the 
legal storm hovers in the too-often ambiguous language of the law itself. 
The Act defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities."5 The Federal 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which administers 
the law,6 describes capabilities such as walking, speaking, seeing, hear-
ing, and caring for oneself as examples of "major life activities."7 The 
question, then, becomes whether the attempt to create life falls within the 
parameters of this designation. 
This note will review the background of the principle case, and com-
pare it to recent similar cases in other jurisdictions, the applicable provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the court's anal-
ysis of Pacourek, in light of the language within the ADA. This note will 
suggest the infertility issue is dispositive of the need for construing the 
ADA in the broad scope that was intended by Congress in its enactment. 
Finally, this note will conclude that employers' statutory duty to provide 
reasonable workplace accommodations in accordance with the ADA 
should extend to persons suffering from infertility in order to afford the 
unilateral equal rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., Inc. 
Charlene Pacourek began working at Inland Steel, Inc., (Inland Steel) 
in March, 197 5. 8 In 1987, she began seeing a doctor regarding her infer-
tility problems, causing her to miss several days of work that year to keep 
her appointments. 9 In March, 1991, she began treatments for infertility. 10 
In August of the same year, her doctor eventually diagnosed her condition 
as unexplained infertility .11 
Pacourek soon began a barrage of infertility treatments during 1991 
and 1992. These treatments included, among other things, intrauterine 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
7. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(l995). 
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insemination and high-potency injections of the hormone Pergonal. 12 
Pacourek was absent from work on some of the days she underwent treat-
ment. The procedures proved fruitless at the time. 13 
In February, 1992, Pacourek's supervisor gave her a "90-Day Perfor-
mance Plan," which directed that she was not to be absent from work dur-
ing the 90-day period without a doctor's excuse. 14 She missed three days 
of work, each time providing a medical explanation from her physician. 15 
In March, 1992, however, her supervisor at Inland Steel told her that she 
had been designated as a "high risk" for termination. 16 Pacourek was ter-
minated in May of 1993. 17 
Pacourek then proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC, which 
granted her the right to sue. 18 Her suit alleged numerous claims, 19 based 
on purported violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,21 and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967,22 as well as her claim under the American with Dis-
abilities Act. As applicable to this discussion, Pacourek contended that 
infertility was a disability which caused her termination, thus violating 
the ADA. 23 Inland Steel countered that the ADA was inapplicable to in-
fertility. Specifically, Inland Steel argued that Pacourek's "unexplained 
infertility" was not an impairment covered by the ADA and that procre-
ation is not a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. 24 
The court agreed with Pacourek, concluding that her unexplained in-
fertility was a physical impairment.25 The court also noted that reproduc-
tion is a "major life activity," according to the broad application intended 
for the stated EEOC regulation. 26 Because it was clear that Ms. Pacourek 
suffered infertility, a physical impairment of the reproductive system, the 
12. ld. 
13. !d. It is of note that in October 1993, Pacourek underwent a successful embryo transfer 
and became pregnant. !d. at 799, n.2. 
14. ld. 
15. ld. 
16. !d. at 799, 800. 
17. ld. 
18. ld. at 799. 
19. ld. Inland Steel apparently chose to contest only the ADA claim, moving for partial 
summary judgment. !d. This is similar to Inland Steel's earlier motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim, which the court also denied. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., Inc., 858 F. Supp 1393, 
1396-97 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (as amended) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (amendment to Title VII) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
22. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (1988). 
23. Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 800. 
24. ld. 
25. ld. at 804. 
26. ld. at 801, 804. 
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court concluded she was, in fact, disabled under the guidelines of the 
AD A, and therefore had a claim. 27 
B. The Split in the Courts 
In Pacourek, the court stated that "it defies common sense to say that 
infertility is not a physiological disorder or condition affecting the repro-
ductive system. "28 In so concluding, the court provided well-reasoned 
analysis on how infertility fits into the ADA definition of disability by 
classifying it as a physical impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities. The crux of the issue facing the Pacourek court 
and other courts in the nation is whether procreation constitutes a "major 
life activity." District courts in Louisiana29 and Iowa30 have concluded 
that it is not. 
1. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc. 
In Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 31 the court found the reasoning 
in Pacourek to be "circular and unpersuasive.'132 The Zatarain court fur-
ther concluded that the Pacourek decision was defective because it 
"would allow [the plaintiff] to bootstrap a finding of substantial limita-
tion of a major life activity onto a finding of an impairment. "33 The court 
continued on to find that reproduction as a "major life activity" would be 
inconsistent with the list of "major life activities" in the ADA 
regulations. Exclusion was justified on the grounds that reproduction is 
not engaged in with the same frequency or regularity as the other actions. 
The court concluded that "[a] person is required to walk, see, learn, 
speak, breath and work ... day in and day out. However, a person is not 
called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day."34 
2. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center 
The Iowa district court, later affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, also re-
fused to recognize the validity of the Pacourek decision. 35 The Krauel 
court asserted that the Pacourek analysis was suspect because it "fail[ed] 
27. /d. at 804. 
28. Id. at 801. 
29. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.La. 1995). 
30. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 915 F. Supp. 102 (1995). The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed this decision in September, 1996 (95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
31. 881 F. Supp. 240. 
32. Id. at 243. 
33. ld. 
34. Id. See 29 C.P.R. §1630.2(i). 
35. 915 F. Supp. 102. 
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to recognize that 'physical or mental impairment' and 'major life activi-
ties' are separate and distinct components" according to the definition of 
disability under the Act. 36 In this instance, the Krauel court regarded re-
production as a lifestyle choice, and thus unqualified for protection under 
the ADA It noted: "Some people choose not to have children, but all 
people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, 
breathe, learn and work, unless a handicap prevents them from doing 
SO. ,37 
III. CREATING A DEHNIDON OF DISABILITY 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199038 was enacted, in part, 
to prevent workplace discrimination against approximately 43 million 
otherwise qualit1ed individuals with a disability.39 The Act specifically 
defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities."40 Under the ADA, an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against a person if that person is qualified for 
a position. 41 
The EEOC has the responsibility of overseeing and enforcing the pro-
visions of the Act. 42 The EEOC interprets its own guidelines for disabili-
ties by using the following three-prong definition of disability: (1) a men-
tal or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity;43 
(2) a record of an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having an impair-
ment.44 
36. !d. at 107 (citing 7ntarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243). 
37. !d. at n.l. 
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
39. Title I of the ADA provides: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment (emphasis added). 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(l) to (3). 
40. /d. at § 12117(a). 
41. !d. at §§ 12111(8), 12112(a). 
42. !d. at § 12117(a). 
43. The ADA defines "physical impairment" as follows: 
IA]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss 
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, 
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, and endocrine. 
Technical Assistance & Resources, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr MANUAL (BNJ}), at 22 
(1993) (emphasis added). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); James R. Neely, Jr., Current 
Critical Issues in l.i1bor and Employment l.i1w: EEOC Compliance Manual, 40 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 
107' 109-17 (1996). 
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It is the first prong of the definition which is the source of concern. If 
infertility is able to meet the first prong of the Act, then the other two 
prongs are necessarily satisfied de facto. 45 Creating a concrete notion of 
what comprises a "major life activity" is pivotal in the designation of 
"disability." Such definitive guidelines are glaringly absent from both the 
language and the legislative history of the Act.46 It is thus not at all sur-
prising that the courts, in attempting to fulfill the goals of the Act,47 
should generate rulings as individualistic as the triers of fact themselves. 
Under the specific ADA guidelines only those individuals who can suc-
cessfully establish that their particular affliction impinges on a major life 
activity may be classified as "disabled" for protection under the ADA.48 
The real challenge is qualifying infertility as a protected disability 
according to the vague and varying definitions available. 
IV. THE PACOUREK TEST FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY AND 
RESULTING CASE ANALYSIS 
The Pacourek court affirmed the dismissal of Inland Steel's partial 
summary judgment motion, ruling that Pacourek' s infertility was a "ma-
jor life activity" that should be covered by the ADA.49 In rejecting the 
arguments in Ziltarain and Krauel, the court used its own three-prong test 
to determine if infertility was an impairment protected by the ADA. The 
Pacourek test includes the following factors: (1) whether the condition is 
a physical or mental impairment; (2) if yes, then whether that impairment 
affects a major life activity; and (3) whether the major life activity is it-
self substantially limited by the impairment. 5° 
The court particularly emphasized the wording of the ADA regula-
tions.51 That language specifically designates the reproductive system as 
one of the bodily systems that can be impaired and covered by the Act. 52 
It is thus logical to assume that if a given malady that affects the repro-
ductive system is termed an impairment under the ADA that the next step 
45. Tomkowicz, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1061 n.32 (1996). 
46. Notable is the Krauel court's stipulation that legislative history "may provide some 
support" for the argument that Congress intended procreation to be a major life activity. 915 F. 
Supp. at 107. It asserts, however, that legislative history is often "highly unreliable" and "hazardous 
at best." /d. (citing Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 
226, 242 (1990)). The Krauel court then justifies its holding against infertility as a disability by 
arguing that legislative intent is opposed to such a designation. /d. at 108. 
47. See Pacourek, supra note 10. 
48. See Tomkowicz, supra note 45, at 1061. 
49. 916 F. Supp. at 804. 
50. /d. at 801. The court specifically applied the third prong to inquire as to "[w]hether the 
major life activity of reproduction is substantially limited by infertility." /d. at 804. 
51. /d. at 801. 
52. /d. citing, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l ). 
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would be to assume that reproduction itself is a major life activity. 53 
Holding otherwise "would ... ma[k]e no sense [as] to includ[ing] the 
reproductive system among the systems that can have an ADA physical 
impairment. "54 
Such reasoning was not the Pacourek court's only support in affirm-
ing the lower court's analysis. The decisions in Zatarain and Krauel were 
criticized and categorically rejected as interpreting major life activities 
too narrowly. 55 These decisions were both based on findings that repro-
duction is not engaged in with the same frequency as other activities. 56 
The other courts found that because reproduction was not an activity re-
quired on a daily basis, it was not a major life activity. Pacourek, how-
ever, points out that "neither the ADA nor its implementing regulations 
either explicity or impliedly defines 'major life activities' by the fre-
quency with which they occur."57 The court in Pacourek concluded that 
by including the reproductive system in the ADA description, the EEOC 
rulemakers anticipated possible physiological disorders that should be 
covered under the Act.58 Further, the court reasoned, since the act of re-
production is probably the "major activity [to be] substantially limited by 
a physiological disorder of the reproductive system," the EEOC surely 
considered that reproduction would be considered a major life activity .59 
With such supports, the Pacourek court charged the Zatarain and Krauel 
courts with "trivializ[ing] reproduction."60 
The Court found that coverage of the act did apply to Ms. Pacourek. 
The court compared Ms. Pacourek's ability to procreate with that of the 
average person and concluded that she was either unable to do so or was 
at the very least substantially limited in performance.61 The court found 
that because Ms. Pacourek's infertility "substantially limits the major life 
53. See !d. 
54. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404. 
55. !d. at 1395. 
56. See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 106-07; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243. 
57. 916 F. Supp. at 803. 
58. !d. at 802. 
59. !d. 
60. !d. at 804. 
61. !d. at 803. The EEOC regulations state that the "substantially limits" connotes: 
The inability] to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population 
can perform that same major life activity. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i-ii) (internal designations omitted). 
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activity"62 that infertility must be a physical impairment that rendered her 
disabled under the ADA 
V. THE INFERTILITY DEBATE OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM 
A. Definition and Scope 
It is estimated that more than 5 million married couples in the United 
states suffer from infertility. 63 The standard generally used for det1ning 
infertility is "the inability of a couple to conceive after twelve months of 
intercourse without contraception."64 The American College of Obstetri-
cians Gynecologists and the American Fertility Society expand on the 
definition by designating infertility as "a disease resulting in the abnor-
mal function of the reproductive system. "65 
General approximations are that 7.9 per cent of the population of re-
productive age is infertile. 66 Further, in 1988 an estimated 4.9 million 
women suffered from infertility according to this detinition. 67 It appears 
that the base percentage of couples atrected by infertility stays relatively 
constant, although the number of couples seeking infertility treatment has 
skyrocketed. 68 This particular increase has been attributed to factors in-
cluding more widespread and improved availability of infertility treat-
ment teclmiques,69 the decreased number of infants available for adop-
tion,70 and the greater social acceptance toward pursuing treatments of 
infertility. 71 
As demonstrated in Pacourek, the pursuit of medical treatment to 
remedy infertility often becomes a very time-consuming quest which of-
ten creates difficulties in balancing personal needs with the responsibili-
ties of the workplace. In addition to workplace pressures, infertility al-
62. Pacourek /, 858 F. Supp. at 1404-05 (citing McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th 
Cir. 1992)). See supra note 37. 
63. See, e.g., Tomk:owicz, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 1053, n.4; S. Rep. No. 102-452, !02nd 
Cong., 2d. Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146. 
64. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Pub. No. OTA-BA-358 Infertility: 
Medical and Social Choices 3, (1988) [hereinafter OTA Report]. 
65. Infertility and National Healfh Care Reform: A Briefing Paper, at 1 (RESOLVE, Inc. 
& The American Fertility Society)(1993) (cited in Tischler, 41 WAYNE L. REV. at 250, n.4). 
66. William D. Mosher & William F. Pratt, Fecundity and Infertility in the United Stales, 
1965-88, ADVANCE DATA AND HEALTH STATISTICS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, (Dec. 4, 1990) at 1. 
67. /d. See generally Tischler, 41 WAYNE L. REV. at 250. 
68. Tischler, at 251; Mosher & Pratt, supra note 66, at I, 5. 
69. OTA Report, supra note 64, at 55-56. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. Tischler also ascribes this trend to other considerations, including that "more couples 
seem to be delaying childbearing" and "the widespread use of contraceptives." 41 WAYNE L. REV. 
at 251, n.21. 
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ways results in a certain amount of psychological stress,72 and often eco-
nomic pressure.73 The application of ADA disability standards to those 
suffering from infertility would allow many afflicted couples to pursue 
treatment for their condition without unnecessary additional concern for 
job security. 
B. The Correct Measure of a Protected Disability: Emphasizing the 
"Major Life Activity" Prong 
The Pacourek court's test for ADA applicability, namely, the focus 
on "major life activity," is a very thoughtful and correct means of deter-
mining that infertility is a covered disability. It is peculiar to argue that 
the procreative process - in essence, creating life - would not be con-
sidered a "major life activity." Most parents would likely disagree with 
any statement to the contrary. For those individuals who want to become 
parents, the successful pregnancy is the first step in realizing that desire. 
As Professor Elizabeth Bartholet stated: "We are all conditioned from 
early childhood to equate personhood with procreation and procreation 
with parenting. "74 
1. When the bodily system fails 
Any defect in the bodily system which effectually deprives a person 
of enjoying the benefits of the principle purposes of that system is an un-
deniably painful condition for the suffering individuaV5 The reproductive 
system has basically one sole function: to reproduce the species. When 
that physiological system is impaired to the point of being unable to carry 
out its basic design, a disability is necessarily created. 
72. See Tomkowicz, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 1085-88, and nn.186-203. 
73. !d. at 1059-60 and n.28 (estimating that a successful delivery following average time 
and techniques of infertility treatments costs between $67,000 to $114,000); Tischler, 41 WAYNE 
L. REV. at 253,257; OTA Report, supra note 64, at 161; RESOLVE, Inc. A Briefing Paper, supra 
note 65, at 4. 
74. FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING 24 (1993). See also 
Tomkowicz, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1053-54. Professor Lawrence A. Frolik elaborates on Professor 
Bartholet's theme by considering economic, as well as social ramifications of infertility: 
Against all rational economic evidence of the cost of children, we are predisposed to want 
them. This is not merely a cultural construct; in every culture people want to have 
children. The desire for children ... is in our nature .... [M]ost do not [resist it] and 
our culture reflects that procreative desire. 
The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do With It? 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV U. PITT L. REV. 841, 873-74 (1996) (internal designations omitted). 
75. See Tomkowicz at 1070-71 (discussing analogies in designation of procreation as a 
major life activity in regard to HIV-AIDS cases in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405 at I (Sept. 
27, 1988), (Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
to HIV-Infected Persons)[hereinafter DOJ Memo]). 
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Any aspects of the reproductive system, including impairments, must 
necessarily fall under the auspices of the ADA - if for no other reason 
than that the affected system itself is listed within the Act's own covered 
guidelines. The specific definitions for a covered disability are not novel 
or unvisited, as the Pacourek court recognized in citing McWright v. Al-
exander. 76 Me Wright held that the designations of impairments under the 
ADA are substantially identical with those of its predecessor, the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.77 
2. Comparing the ability to "interact with others" with the rest of the 
population 
In the Pacourek holding, the emphasis was correctly placed on the 
"major life activities" prong. In its appendix, the EEOC is abundantly 
clear in its directive that their list of activities "is not exhaustive" or 
"limited to" those listed in the guidelines.78 This principle of broad inter-
pretation of a disability is an established judicial tenet.79 The spirit of the 
Act encourages a broad reading of "major life activities," since it 
provides that they are "basic activities that the average person in the gen-
eral population can perform with little or no difficulty."80 Nowhere is a 
standard or requirement stated for the frequency or regularity of the ac-
tion, as the court in Zatarain would suggestY In its Memorandum, the 
EEOC expanded previous examples of major life activites to also include 
"emotional processes such as ... interacting with others," emphasizing 
the individual's functioning as compared with that of a normal person.82 
Through the express language of the Act, and additional interpreta-
tion by the EEOC,83 the Pacourek court's holding is correct. The EEOC's 
76. 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992). 
77. 29 U.S.C. §791 (199S). Compare 29 C.P.R. §§1613.702(a)(l), (b)(l), and (c) with 29 
C.P.R. §§ I630.2(g)(l), (h)(!), and (I) (199S). Also, the EEOC's interpretive guidance on the ADA, 
equates the regulations under the ADA with those under the Rehabilitation Act. 
Congress adopted the definition of "disability" from the Rehabilitation Act definition of 
the term "individual with handicaps." This demonstrates that Congress intended that the 
relevant case law that developed under the Rehabilitation Act be applicable to the term 
"disability" as outlined in the ADA. 29 C.P.R. § 1630 app. at 401 (citing H.R. Rep. 48S, 
JOist Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 2, at SO (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 329-30. 
See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 802-03; Erickson, 911 F. Supp. 316. 
78. 29 C.P.R. § 1630. app., § 1630.2(i)(l99S). 
79. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
80. 29 C.P.R. § 1630. app., § 1630.2(i). 
81. 881 F. Supp. at 243. 
82. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) 902, at IS (March 14, 199S). 
83. See supra note 7S. The DOJ Memo focused on the impact that HJV has on an infected, 
though asymptomatic, person to procreate. !d. at 6-7. The memorandum concluded that "there is 
little doubt that procreation is a major life activity" and that infected persons cannot pursue this 
"basic human desire without significant fears concerning ... the impact [the virus may have on 
his] biological child." !d. 
287] INFERTILITY UNDER THE A.D.A. 297 
latest guidance memorandum, titled "Definition of the Term Disability", 
includes "interacting with others" as a major life activity. 84 This is cer-
tainly significant, as there is no more elemental and personal interaction 
between individuals than that of procreation. The court in Erickson fur-
ther held that even if procreation is a "complex process," not a simple 
one, such as walking or seeing might be, that such a standard is unpersua-
sive and "the simplicity or complexity of the process is insignificant. "85 
By definition, then, an individual suffering the effects of infertility 
should certainly be declared disabled under the terms of the Act. As pre-
viously stated, infertility is found when an individual has been unable to 
conceive a child within a the space of one year. 86 This is certainly in con-
trast with the average person in the general population. Designating pro-
creation as a major life activity based on its status as elemental human 
interaction is alone sufficient to be in harmony with the regulations of the 
Act and subsequent interpretive guidance of the EEOC in recognition of 
the concept. 
VI. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF PARENTING AND PROCREATION 
Fundamental rights are accorded special protection under the 
Constitution. The right to procreate, however, gained its fundamental sta-
tus not in the explicit provisions of the Constitution, but through a long 
line of Supreme Court cases. 87 In the early case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 88 
the Court specifically held that one of the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment was "the right of the individual ... to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children. "89 
A House Report on the ADA states that a "person infected with HIV is covered under the first 
prong of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to procreation( . ... ]" H.R. Rep 
NO. 101-485 (1990), (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 344)(emphasis added). See also Doe 
v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994)(finding that reproduction is a 
major life activity under the ADA for a person infected with HIV). 
Tomkowicz argues that if the HIV-infected individual is protected in the Act because the 
potential of transmission of the virus to a biological child limits the major life activity of 
procreation, "then an infertile person, whose physical impairment substantially limits his or her 
ability to procreate in the first instance, likewise should be afforded the protection of the Act. ... 
No such arbitrary distinction [ ... ] should be drawn." 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 1071. 
84. See generally, .fupra note 83. 
85. 911 F. Supp. 316. 
86. See supra notes 63-65. 
87. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(holding that marriage and procreation are 
fundamental righl~). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(recognizing, in dicta, the 
right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into matters "so fundamentally affecting a 
pers,m" as relating to bearing a child). 
88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
89. !d. at 399. 
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The Court continued this rationale in the landmark case of Skinner v. 
Oklahoma.90 The Court termed procreation to be "one of the basic civil 
rights of man" that is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race."91 Since then, the Court, in reliance on Skinner, has also termed 
procreation to be one of "the most intimate concerns of an individual's 
Iife."92 
This right was deemed Constitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut,93 
establishing a fundamental right to aspects of "marital privacy." Although 
the Justices could not apply a particular clause of the Constitution, they 
emphasized broad interpretations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. They concluded that the right of couples to bear 
or beget children was a "longstanding tenet" of American legal history. 94 
Justice Harlan, in concurrence, stated that this right to privacy was the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. 95 
Recent cases before the Court have preserved this right. In Planned 
Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 96 the Court continued to hold pro-
creation as an "important decision." Here, the Court concluded: "While 
the outer limits of this aspect of [protected liberty] have not been marked 
by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may 
make . . . are personal decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation . . . 
family relationships, and child rearing .... "'97 The Casey decision dem-
onstrates a firm commitment to the constitutional value that procreation is 
an important and protected aspect of individual liberty. This holding was 
affirmed by a federal district coure8 to include within a "cluster of consti-
tutionally protected choices" that of the right to pursue medical treatment 
that promotes procreation. The Court significantly noted, in dicta, that 
"there must be included [in the cluster of constitutionally protected 
choices] the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring 
b ,gg a out ... pregnancy. 
90. 316 u.s. 535. 
91. /d. at 541. 
92. Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan. J., dissenting). 
93. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
94. /d. at 486. See Erika T. Blum, H-7!en Terminating Parental Rights is Not Enough: A 
New Look at Compulsory Sterilization, 28 GA. L. REV. 977, 985-86 (1994). 
95. Griswold, at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
96. 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992). 
97. /d. (citations omitted). 
98. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990), a!f'd. mem., 914 F.2d 
260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991)(finding a violation of a Constitutional 
right to privacy regarding that part of the Illinois Abortion Law prohibiting the sale or 
e-xperimentation on "a fetus . . . unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby 
produced." 735 F. Supp. at 1363, 1377). 
99. /d. at 1377 (emphasis added). 
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Merely the absence of a complete barrier to participating in a major 
life activity- namely, procreation- should not place infertility outside 
of the protection of the ADA 100 Even if the analysis turns not upon the 
activity itself, the consequences intended to be effected by that activity-
successful pregnancy-should be dispositive. The court in Abbott v. 
Bragdon recognized that any impairment that renders an individual infer-
tile, limiting the ability to procreate, would satisfy the statutory require-
ments for protection under the Act. 101 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
Infertility is a condition that affects a substantial number of people in 
the United States. As more and more couples seek out improved 
techniques to remedy this impairment, employment issues will arise more 
frequently. This is especially true in regard to insurance benetits coverage 
and allowing time off work to pursue medical treatment. Before these 
policies can be dealt with effectively, however, there is an urgent need to 
consider the status of infertility as a disability. If couples are to enjoy the 
protection of their fundamental constitutional rights to become parents, 
they must be protected when their efforts are physiologically frustrated. 
The ADA is a civil rights statute. Civil rights statutes are generally held 
to he construed liberally to "effectuate [their] remedial purpose."102 Thus 
the Pacourek court's view of reproduction as a major life activity under 
the ADA is certainly in harmony with this canon of construction. 
The purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act is to protect 
those with disabilities from discrimination in the workplace due to their 
disability. Infertility is a disability which deserves protection from dis-
crimination according to the terms of the ADA It is certainly a physio-
logical disorder of the reproductive system, which substantially limits a 
major life activity -- child bearing. To qualify under the ADA, the dis-
ability must substantially limit a major life activity. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission is explicit in its specification that in deter-
mining the existence of a disability "it is not necessary to consider if a 
person is substantially limited in the major life activity of working if the 
person is substantially limited in any other major life activity."103 
The Pacourek court was correct to focus its analysis on the determi-
native prong of specifying that a disability must affect a major life activ-
100. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D.Me. 1995). 
101. Jd. at 584. 
102. Stoner v. Department of Agriculture, 846 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Wis. 1994); Keller 
v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1987). 
103. Technical Assistance & Re,murces, BNA's Americans with Disabilities Act Manual 
(BNA), at 24 (1993). 
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ity. To allow Ms. Pacourek the opportunity to pursue her claim of dis-
crimination in the courts is entirely proper. This ruling clearly follows the 
intent with which the mandate was passed. The broad scope under which 
the Act was intended to be interpreted would establish infertility as a dis-
ability. This designation would not only establish guidelines for coverage 
of treatment and for workplace policies (i.e. scheduling, sick days, etc.), 
but would provide a much-needed boon to infertility sufferers. To 
exclude infertility from the coverage of the Act would effectuate dispa-
rate treatment against those with reproductive impairment. Fundamental 
constitutional principles demand equal treatment for all. Those with in-
fertility are no different from those suffering with any other disability; as 
such, it is only just and proper that they are also permitted to enjoy the 
benefits of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Kristina M. Hall 
